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 Research on the cost of capital and on the social discount rate (SDR) has 
developed largely along separate paths. This paper offers an overview and 
comparison of both concepts. The consumption-based theory of discount rates  
is common to both, but there are striking differences in how the cost of capital 
and SDR are estimated. A project’s cost of capital is inferred in practice from 
market data, by a well-established package of techniques, and project risk 
makes a large difference. In contrast, the SDR is estimated by applying 
judgement about the welfare of future generations, in the setting of 
consumption-based theory. Project risk has tended to be ignored under the SDR 
approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 The discount rate has a massive impact on the present value (PV) of long-lived 
projects, especially on projects where most of the benefits arise in the fairly distant future, say 
after 100 years. Many projects have lifetimes of decades or centuries, including investment in 
infrastructure, housing, energy, research and development, and investment to protect the 
environment and reduce global warming. Such projects are found extensively in the private as 
well as the public sector. 
 The discount rate for projects in the private sector is known as the cost of capital, and 
is discussed in the finance literature. The discount rate for projects in the public sector is 
known as the social discount rate (SDR), and is discussed in the literature on public sector 
economics. Research on the two rates has developed quite separately, especially on the 
finance side where the SDR is almost never mentioned. Are the two really the same concept, 
or do they differ in some ways? This paper aims to provide an informative comparison of the 
two concepts. It should be of interest especially for readers with a finance background who 
are unfamiliar with the SDR. No systematic comparison has previously been made, though 
the applicability or otherwise of the cost of capital to public projects is a theme in research on 
the SDR. The debate about investment to alleviate climate change is a high-profile application 
of the SDR which is referred to in the paper.  
 The comparison enables several points to be highlighted. The first point concerns the 
role of theory. Consumption-based theory provides the analytical framework for thinking 
about discount rates in both approaches, so in this core respect the two are the same. But they 
differ very much in their process for the estimation of discount rates, in their use of the 
theory, and in the tradition that the SDR is a risk-free rate.  
 The finance approach uses theory to try to understand what determines discount rates, 
and to predict what discount rates should be observed, given plausible assumptions about risk 
aversion and the other variables in a consumption-based model. If the predictions from such a 
model differ from expected rates of return estimated from market data – and they tend to 
differ – the estimates from market data are the ones which are used for the purpose of 
estimating the cost of capital in practice. There is a well-developed package of techniques 
which is used for estimation in practice, outlined in Section 3. 
 In contrast, the SDR approach uses consumption-based theory to help guide the 
application of judgement by a public sector executive about the welfare of future people. 
Judgement involves appeal to evidence, including market data, but market data do not take 
priority. The amounts of utility from future cash flows can be judged to differ from the 
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amounts of utility that are implicit in a cost of capital estimated from market data. As a result, 
the SDR applied to a given project can differ from its estimated cost of capital, with a smaller 
SDR reflecting a greater weight for future utility. In practice SDRs tend to be lower, 
sometimes much lower, than estimates of the cost of capital for private-sector projects.  
 Second, risk and the premium for bearing risk are of central importance in the 
practical application of the cost of capital. Differences in estimated risk result in large 
differences in the cost of capital. Risk is much less prominent in the SDR approach. Much of 
the SDR literature uses the Ramsey formula for the discount rate, which assumes that the 
project is risk-free. In principle this is a mistake, since public projects do not in general 
provide risk-free benefits to society. The risk or consumption beta of a public project could be 
estimated from the covariance of the project’s benefits with consumption per head. But even 
if risk is allowed for in public projects, the risk premiums that arise in standard consumption-
based models are small, less than 0.5% per year, compared with the risk premiums estimated 
in practice for private sector projects. This is a corollary of the famous equity-premium 
puzzle: consumption-based theory predicts a much smaller premium than is estimated from 
market data. 
 Third, discounting using the cost of capital in practice always involves a constant risk 
premium over multiple future periods. The equity risk premium is usually estimated to be at 
least three per cent per year. This is the premium that is used in valuing project equity with 
average risk, ie a beta of around one. The impact of a premium of a few percentage points on 
the PV of a long-term project is enormous. Compounding a constant premium implies that the 
valuer’s uncertainty about the future cash flows increases steadily with the distance of the 
cash flows into the future. If the valuer’s uncertainty does not, in fact, increase in this way 
with the time horizon, it is not correct to compound a fixed premium. So the relationship 
between the valuer’s uncertainty and the time horizon is critical. This is not a new point, but 
we suggest that it is one that deserves more prominence. 
 Fourth, there are arguments for using a declining discount rate for long-term projects. 
A declining discount rate means that the rates applied to future periods decline with distance 
into the future. The possibility of a declining rate for long-term projects is absent from the 
finance-driven package of techniques used to estimate the cost of capital. However, if the PV 
of a project is estimated as an average of the PVs using different possible discount rates, the 
PV using the lowest rate will increasingly dominate the average as project life increases. This 
procedure has the same impact on the best-guess PV as does discounting by a single rate that 
is lower for longer-term projects. 
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2. Consumption-based theory 
2.1 Outline 
 The cost of capital and the SDR share a common theoretical background. An outline is 
needed in order to follow the subsequent discussion.1 People are assumed to make decisions 
in order to maximise their lifetime utility, that is, the utility from their current consumption 
together with the utility from their expected consumption during the rest of their life. 
Collective behaviour is modelled by the behaviour of a representative individual, or by what 
we will call society. It is common, and convenient, to assume that society has a utility 
function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), which is of the form 
 U(C) = C1η/(1  η) (1) 
so   MU(C)   =  Cη (2) 
where MU(C) = dU(C)/dC, and η is the elasticity of marginal utility, or the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. If η > 0, the utility function is concave and society is risk-averse. 
Reasonable values for η are usually considered to be between one and four. They are based on 
empirical evidence about how risk-averse people are, and on judgement about what seems 
plausible. To gain a feel for the impact of η, suppose that consumption at the present date will 
turn out to be either plus or minus 10% (50%) of its expected value, with equal probability. 
An individual with η = 2.0 in equation (1) would pay 1% (25%) of the expected value of 
consumption to avoid this uncertainty. CRRA implies that these proportions are the same 
whatever the absolute amount of expected consumption. 
Society maximises lifetime utility by saving to the point at which the marginal utility 
from saving, ie from the resulting higher consumption in the future, is the same as the 
marginal utility from consumption at date 0. Assume first that the future is known for certain. 
Consider an asset that provides a risk-free payoff t periods ahead. Investing one unit of 
consumption in the asset at date 0 provides 𝑒𝑡𝑟𝐹 units at date t, where rF is the continuously 
compounded risk-free interest rate. The condition for maximising lifetime utility is  
 MU0 = 𝑒𝑡𝑟𝐹MUte–t (3) 
where MUt is marginal utility at date t, and  is the discount rate for utility, or the rate of pure 
time preference. A positive  means that the utility to be experienced from a given amount of 
consumption at date t contributes less to lifetime utility than utility from the same amount of 
consumption today. The standard justification for a positive   is that people are impatient; 
they prefer to consume now rather than in the future. 
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The interest rate is determined as the rate which solves equation (3): 
 rF   = (1/t)ln(e
tMU0/MUt) (4) 
Let be g be the continuously compounded growth rate of consumption, so Ct = C0e
tg. With the 
CRRA utility function, equation (5) can be written as 
 rF = (1/t)ln[e
tC0
η/(C0e
tg)η]  
  =  + (1/t){ln(C0η) – [ln(C0η) – tηg]}  
  =  + ηg (5) 
The interest rate is positive if Ct > C0, and so MUt < MU0; if society will be better off in the 
future, the interest rate needs to be positive for society to be indifferent between saving and 
consumption at date 0. If future utility is discounted ( > 0), this is a second reason for a 
positive interest rate. Equation (555) is the formula presented in Ramsey (1928).2 
 Now assume that future consumption is uncertain. Specifically, assume that the 
growth rate per period g = ln(C/C–1) is independent and identically distributed over time, 
i.e. it follows a random walk (arithmetic Brownian motion). In this case C/C–1 is 
lognormally distributed, and g is normally distributed. Let the expected value of g be μ and 
the variance be 2. μ and 2 are the same for each future date. The expected value of 
consumption at date t is 
 E(Ct) = 𝐶0E(∏ 𝑒
𝑔𝜏)𝑡=1   
  = 𝐶0𝑒
𝑡(+0.52) (6) 
This uses the fact that, for any variable X (here, 𝑒𝑔𝜏) which is lognormally distributed, 
 E(X) = exp[E(lnX) + 0.5var(lnX)] (7) 
where var(lnX) = variance of lnX. Because the covariance between g and g–1 is zero under a 
random walk, the variance of consumption at date t is 𝑒𝑡𝜎
2
. 
 The utility from investing one unit of consumption in the risk-free asset is now 
𝑒𝑡𝑟𝐹E(MUt)e–t. So the equivalent of equation (5) with uncertain growth is 
 rF = (1/t)ln[e
tMU0/E(MUt)] 
  =  + (1/t){ln(C0η) – [ln(C0η) – tημ + 0.5η2t2]}  
  =  + ημ – 0.5η22 (8) 
where the second step uses the last line of (6). Equation (8) has an additional term which 
implies that the risk-free rate is negatively related to the variance of the growth rate 2. 
Greater uncertainty about future consumption implies higher expected marginal utility from 
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risk-free saving, and a lower risk-free rate. However, this additional term is small for 
conventional values of η and 2. 
 We now turn to risky assets. Assume that the uncertain payoff Yjt from investing one 
consumption unit in a risky asset j is given by 𝑌𝑗𝑡 = Π𝜏=1
𝑡 𝑒𝑦𝑗𝜏 , where yj is uncertain at each 
date between  = 1 and t. If we assume further that yj is independent and identically 
distributed over time, it follows that 
 E(Yjt) = E(Π𝜏=1
𝑡 𝑒𝑦𝑗𝜏)  
  = 𝑒𝑡[?̅?𝑗+0.5var(𝑦𝑗)] (9) 
where ?̅?𝑗 = E(yj), and its variance var(yj), are the same for all dates. At this point we 
introduce the concept of the certainty-equivalent payoff of Yjt, CE(Yjt). The is the certain 
payoff that provides the same utility at date t as the uncertain payoff Yjt. The utility at date t of 
Yjt is E[(Yjt)(Ct)
η]. The utility of its certainty-equivalent is CE(Yjt)E(Ct)
η. Therefore, 
 CE(Yjt) = E[(Yjt)(Ct)
η]/E(Ct)
η (10) 
 Since yj and g follow a random walk, 𝑒𝑦𝑗, (eg)η and 𝑒𝑦𝑗(eg)η are lognormally 
distributed and the same for each period. It is the case that  
 lnE(XY) = E(lnX) + E(lnY) 
   + 0.5[var(lnX) + var(lnY) + 2cov(lnX, lnY)] (11) 
if X, Y, and XY are lognormally distributed. Using equations (6) and (11), equation (10) can be 
written as 
 CE(Yjt) = exp{t[?̅?𝑗+ 0.5var(yj) – ηcov(yj, g)]} (12) 
Using equations (9) and (12), the risk premium on the asset expressed as E(Yjt)/CE(Yjt) is  
 exp[tηcov(yj, g)] = exp(tjπ) (13) 
where j = cov(yj, g)/2 is the consumption beta of asset j, and π = η2 is the premium for 
systematic risk. Now we can write 
 CE(Yjt) = E(Yjt)𝑒−𝑡𝛽𝑗𝜋 (14) 
The discount rate of the risky asset, j, can be found from  
 E(𝑌𝑗𝑡)𝑒
−𝑡𝜌𝑗 = CE(Yjt)𝑒−𝑡𝑟𝐹     
  = E(𝑌𝑗𝑡)𝑒
−𝑡(𝑟𝐹+𝛽𝑗𝜋) 
 j   = rF + j (15)  
This is the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). The term j quantifies the 
expected risk premium on the asset. Equation (15) says that an asset with returns which 
covary positively with changes in consumption will be priced to give a positive risk premium. 
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Risk does not mean uncertainty about payoff per se, but the belief that the asset will pay least 
in recession.3 
 
2.2 Risk and the time horizon  
 A further point, possibly less well known, concerns the interplay between risk and the 
time horizon. This is critical to the valuation of long-lived projects.4 Let the discount rate for 
risky asset j be j, and the risk premium j – rF be positive and constant per period, as is 
normal practice. It does not matter how j is arrived at; it need not be j in the consumption-
based model. It is the case that  
 E(Yjt)/CE(Yjt) = 𝑒𝑡(𝜃𝑗−𝑟𝐹) (16)  
Equation (16) makes a crucial point. A constant risk premium per period involves the implicit 
assumption that the total premium for risk increases exponentially, the further into the future 
the cash flow will arise. 
 For example, suppose j = 10% per year, rF = 5%, and we are considering two payoffs, 
one with an expected value of $100 after one year and the other with an expected value of 
$100 after five years. Then CE($1001) = $95.1 and CE($1005) = $77.9, so the PV of the 
compensation for risk increases from $4.9/e0.1 = $4.4 for the year-one payment to $22.1/e0.5 = 
$13.4 for the year-five payment. 
 In the CCAPM above, compounding a constant premium involves assuming that 
covariance risk j, and the premium  per period for bearing risk, are constant per period, as is 
clear in equation (14). However, these outcomes are correct in the model only if our 
uncertainty is such that it is reasonable to assume that yj and g follow a random walk. 
Putting it approximately, compounding a constant premium is justified only if uncertainty 
about assets’ payoffs and economic growth do in fact increase with the time horizon. 
Suppose, on the other hand,  that we can forecast the payoff Yjt with as much as confidence 
whether it arises after five years or after ten years. In this case it is clearly not correct to 
assume that the relation between time horizon and uncertain payoff can be expressed as 𝑌𝑗𝑡 =
Π𝜏=1
𝑡 𝑒𝑦𝑗𝜏 , where yj follows a random walk. Compounding a constant risk premium per period 
is therefore not justified in this case, and would result in undervaluation of the project. The 
way in which the forecast risk of the cash flows for a given real-life project increases, as the 
time horizon lengthens, deserves thought for each project. 
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2.3 Predictions from consumption-based theory 
 The predictions depend critically on the values assumed for the four parameters. 
Weitzman (2007a) suggests that the following ‘quartet of twos’ are representative of the 
numbers that economists accept as reasonable: δ  =  2.0%; η  =  2.0; μ  =  2.0%; σ  =  2.0%. 
The mean real growth rate and its standard deviation, μ and σ, are based on historical evidence 
from mature economies and on predictions for future growth. The rate of pure time preference 
and the coefficient of risk aversion, δ and η, are more debatable. Assume for simplicity that 
returns on the stock market are perfectly correlated with growth of consumption, and that both 
have the same volatility. In this case ηcov(rj, g) = η2 in equation (13).5 Inserting the quartet 
of twos into equations (8) and (15) then gives the following predictions: 
   rF   =  5.92% 
 E(rE)   =  6.00% 
where E(rE) is the expected return on equity. So the predicted equity premium is 0.08% per 
year. These predictions compare with the following empirical numbers for mature economies, 
based on historical arithmetic averages over the last 100 years or so: 
   rF    1% 
 rE  7% 
and so the historic premium is approximately 6% per year. Many would regard a figure of 3% 
or 4% as more realistic for the equity premium looking forwards. 
 The two puzzles that arise from comparing the predicted with the observed numbers 
are (i) the observed equity premium is much higher than the model can explain, and (ii) the 
risk-free rate is much lower. There is an important difference between these puzzles. If δ = 
0.1% instead of 2.0%, and η = 1.0 instead of 2.0, as in the Stern Review (2006) on climate 
change, the predicted risk-free rate is only 2.1%, much closer to its historical average,6 
whereas the equity-premium puzzle is still just as great. It is possible to predict a low risk-free 
rate, similar to the observed number, with low but still-plausible values of δ and η, whereas it 
is not possible to predict an equity premium of more than about 0.5% even with very high 
values of η. The fundamental empirical problem for the model is that the historic variance of 
consumption per head is not enough to justify much of an equity premium. 
 
3. Finance in practice: estimation of the cost of capital 
 Although the theory just outlined is fundamental in finance, it is not used in practice to 
estimate the cost of capital. Practice is guided by a well established practical finance package 
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of ideas and methods of estimation, found in finance textbooks below advanced level, and 
used by companies, regulators of private-sector utility companies, and consultants.7 A 
project’s cost of capital is the expected rate of return estimated on an asset with the same risk 
as the project. The CAPM is the leading model in textbooks and in practice used for 
estimation. The key point for our purposes is that the ingredients of the CAPM – the risk-free 
rate, the beta of the asset, and the equity risk premium – are estimated from market data, that 
is, data about traded financial assets, such as prices and dividends. There are ongoing debates 
about what the best methods are to estimate these ingredients, and also about the possible use 
of multifactor models of expected returns. The residual-income method of inferring the 
expected rate of return on individual shares has become popular in academic papers. 
 If the project’s optimal capital structure includes debt, the project’s cost of capital is 
the tax-adjusted weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The cost of a loan is approximated 
by the easily-observed promised interest rate (gross of income tax) on the face value of the 
loan, though this overstates the expected rate of return on risky debt. The WACC is used to 
discount cash flows from the project that are gross of interest on debt, net of corporation tax 
ignoring interest on debt, and gross of personal taxes. 
 Once a discount rate has been estimated, it is applied for each future period of the 
expected life of the project. Uncertainty about the assumptions underlying the cash flow 
forecasts, or about the discount rate, is usually captured by means of estimating a range of 
PVs using a range of assumptions and discount rates. There is little in the finance literature on 
how to estimate a project’s risk, as opposed to the risk of a traded financial asset, nor on how 
to ‘translate’ that risk into a discount rate. The main method recommended is to find a listed 
firm in a similar business to the business of the project, and use estimates of the cost equity 
for the listed firm as the basis for the project’s discount rate. 
 
4.0 The social discount rate 
4.1 The SDR approach 
 The term social discount rate, or rate of social time preference, normally means the 
rate applicable to long-term projects in the public sector. A public project could in principle 
be treated like a private sector project. For example, its cost of capital could be inferred using 
the (degeared) cost of equity estimated for a listed company thought to have similar business 
risk to that of the project. However, the modern SDR approach does not take the path of the 
practical finance package of seeking to infer the discount rate from market data. The approach 
is for a public sector executive to use consumption-based theory to help determine what the 
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SDR should be, whereas in finance the theory is used to try to explain observed expected rates 
of return on financial assets. The literature on the SDR takes as its foundation the Ramsey 
formula, rF =  + ηg. This involves assuming that both the growth rate of consumption and 
the project’s cash flows are certain. These assumptions appear to be maintained for simplicity, 
and because of a tradition that public projects should be discounted by the risk-free rate (see 
Section 4.2). 
    The expected growth rate of consumption, µ, and its standard deviation, σ (if used), 
are based on empirical evidence in the SDR approach, as in finance. But the rate of pure time 
preference δ, and the coefficient of risk aversion η, are based explicitly on ethical judgement, 
as well as, in the case of η, empirical evidence.8 Dasgupta (2008, p. 150), for example, writes 
that the SDR ‘has to be derived from an overall conception of intergenerational well-being 
and the consumption forecast’. Evidence from attempts to infer δ and η ‘from the choices 
people make as they go about their lives’ (p. 147) is an input to the estimation of those 
parameters, but it is not the only consideration. If the SDR for a project as calculated by an 
executive differs from an estimate of its cost of capital based on market data, the SDR takes 
priority and the discrepancy is not necessarily a major cause for concern. 
 One reason for rejecting market data is that market interest rates do not exist beyond a 
horizon of 30 years, which is the longest maturity of most government bonds. Undated 
government bonds do exist, but the markets for them are illiquid. Historic data could be used 
to estimate an expected rate of return over a long horizon from owning a succession of short-
term Treasury bills, but the result would be approximate and dependent on assuming that the 
future will resemble the past. The focus on government bonds is perhaps a corollary of the 
view that funding for public projects is risk-free, and so the expected returns on risky assets 
are not relevant. If this view is rejected, the expected rate of return on equity potentially 
becomes relevant market-based evidence for risky projects, as in Weitzman (2007a). 
 The most important reason for explicit appeal to ethical judgement in the SDR is 
probably the view that market data, whether from bonds or equities, might not reflect enough 
concern for the welfare of future generations. The assumed aim of the government under the 
SDR approach is to maximise the utility of society, including the utility of people yet to be 
born (intergenerational utility). The assumed aim of an individual is to maximise her own 
lifetime utility. Some lifetime utility could come from anticipation of the utility of the 
individual’s heirs, which would explain why people make bequests. Despite this, SDR 
proponents hold, first, that people alive today might, through their individual behaviour, act to 
maximise their own lifetime utility rather than intergenerational utility, and second, that they 
10 
 
might, nevertheless, elect a government which would act to benefit future generations at the 
expense of the current generation. This view is an example of what Sen and Williams (1982, 
p. 16) call Government House utilitarianism (see also Lind, 1982, pp. 55-9, and Dietz, 
Hepburn, and Stern, 2008, for a recent defence). Since market data are supposed to reflect the 
revealed preferences of individuals acting to maximise their lifetime utility, rather than 
intergenerational utility, market data are not to be trusted for the purpose of making decisions 
intended to maximise intergenerational utility. Put differently, people tend to ignore or 
undervalue externalities in their individual behaviour, and the effects of behaviour on future 
generations are externalities. 
 An important example is carbon emissions. ‘Business as usual’, with no mitigation of 
carbon emissions, involves an externality via probable global warming and the resulting 
imposition of possibly huge costs on future generations. So observed expected rates of return 
on assets such as equity, and therefore estimates of the cost of capital, exceed the social rates 
of return on such assets (Dasgupta, 2008; Stern, 2008). The social rate of return on an asset is 
the expected internal rate of return after the externalities attributable to the asset have been 
valued and ‘translated’ into cash flows to include in the cash flow forecast. Climate change is 
an example of a negative externality from current economic activity, one that in principle 
could be costed and included in cash flow forecasts.9 But even ignoring such specific and 
potentially measurable externalities, someone who believes that the behaviour of people alive 
today does not place enough weight on the welfare of future generations, will believe that the 
utility from long-term projects is greater than the utility that is implied by the observed 
expected rates of return on long-term assets. 
 Broome (1994), for example, maintains that ‘it is only the disenfranchisement of 
future generations that gives us the share of the world’s resources that we have’ (p. 152). In 
support of this, he presents a thought experiment in which a trust fund is set up which would 
act in the interests of future generations. He regards it as self-evident that ‘from the trust’s 
point of view… future commodities would be much more valuable than they seem to us who 
are participating in the market now’, and that the trust would transfer resources from the 
present to the future. But the trust’s purchases of future commodities would not reduce market 
interest rates permanently, as he assumes that interest rates are determined by the productivity 
of the economy’s technology.10 So if we took proper account of the welfare of future 
generations, we would use a lower SDR than market interest rates. 
 There are other possible grounds for incorporating ethical judgement in the SDR. A 
justification that differs from concern about future utility comes from the concepts of rights 
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and sustainability (for example, Anand and Sen, 2000). This perspective can lead to doubt 
about the adequacy of the expected utility approach. It can be argued that a fundamental 
ethical principal is that people have an equal right to well-being. From this follows the view 
that current decisions and consumption should be sustainable, meaning that they should not 
damage the prospects for the well-being of future generations. One version of the 
sustainability argument is that the Earth’s ‘capital’, its potential to sustain life, should not be 
depleted. Current consumption should therefore be from ‘income’, ie from output that does 
not deplete the planet’s capital. However, it is not easy to spell out in practical terms what 
sustainable development consists of. 
 There are also various special cases to consider, which invite a low discount rate, or 
other special treatment of investment decisions, or regulation. Some ‘commodities’, such as 
fresh air, or more generally a reasonably healthy environment, could be considered especially 
important to maintain prospects for well-being. This could justify, for example, a very low 
discount rate for public projects designed to maintain a reasonably healthy environment. 
Some activities, such as lifesaving, discussed by Broome (1994), provide utility which does 
not diminish as society becomes richer. Some commodities might be seen as essential for 
future well-being, and so as not substitutable at all for other commodities, in which case they 
will be regarded as necessary to have at almost any cost. Some features of the world might be 
given a special status because once lost they cannot be replaced, such as a species of animal 
or an archaeological site. 
 Finally, Stern (2006, 2008) emphasises that the opportunity cost of capital is a 
marginal concept. That is, it assumes that the project in question is small in relation to the 
market, meaning that the relevant market prices are not affected by whether or not the project 
is undertaken. He emphasises that it is a basic mistake to use this marginal concept in the 
context of climate change. Global warming is likely to affect market prices in future, and 
efforts to reduce it could affect market prices today. This argument is perhaps superfluous as a 
justification of the SDR approach as outlined, since the SDR approach does not rely on appeal 
to market data even for small projects.  
 We now consider separately the two parameters in equation (5), δ and η. Many authors 
support a value for δ of very close to zero, though 1.0% is common in the finance literature 
and some authors suggest higher values (very little is said about δ in finance, even in 
advanced texts). The key argument for δ  0 is that it is unethical to weight utility according 
to when the person is alive. The time a person is alive is, in itself, not a relevant consideration 
when it comes to weighting utility. The Stern Review, for example, concludes that δ ought to 
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exceed zero only to the extent that it reflects the possibility that humanity might not exist after 
some future date. The Review sets δ at 0.1% per year. 
 The parameter η provokes further questions. With the CRRA utility function, η 
measures both the rate at which the utility from marginal consumption declines as 
consumption grows over time, and aversion to uncertainty about consumption at a given date, 
ie aversion to risk. In the first of these roles, a higher η implies a desire for less inequality in 
levels of consumption over time (as does a higher δ). Marginal consumption today provides 
high utility compared with marginal consumption in the future. A person with a high η 
chooses higher consumption now and in the near future, and slower growth of consumption, 
compared with a person with a low η. A lower η implies greater concern about future welfare, 
and a lower SDR. A consequence of lower η is less consumption today, ie higher saving. 
Dasgupta (2008) and Nordhaus (2007) argue that a value of η of, say, 1.0, as in the Stern 
Review, implies that the proportion of income which would be saved is very high; 40% or 
more. This is uncomfortable because it is unrealistic that such high savings ratios will arise, 
and because it suggests that the current generation should consume much less than it actually 
does, for the benefit of the future, even though people in the future are already forecast to be 
substantially richer than are people today.  
 In its second role of reflecting aversion to risk, we have seen that lower η implies a 
lower risk premium, which exacerbates the equity-premium puzzle. However, for plausible 
values of η of up to about 4.0, differences in η make very little difference to the predicted 
premium in equation (15).  
Perhaps more troubling is a comparison with a third role for η, that of reflecting 
concern about cross-sectional income inequality at a given date. Lower η in this role implies 
less concern about the welfare of the poor, because the marginal utility from increasing 
income for the poor increases with η. We have the awkward conclusion that a public sector 
executive concerned about current income inequality should apply a high η in her project 
appraisals, whereas she should apply a low η if she is concerned about the welfare of future 
generations. One answer is to use a utility function in which aversion to risk, and to income 
inequality at a given date, are separate from aversion to inequality of consumption over time. 
A number of papers explore such a utility function, including Gollier (2002a). 
 A general question about the SDR approach is, how do we agree on values of δ and η, 
and hence set the SDR?11 Or if we are using a declining discount rate (below), how should the 
decline be determined? The values of δ and η are based partly on individual reflection under 
the SDR approach, so the values proposed will differ across SDR users. The published 
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responses to the Stern Review show how much disagreement there is about the SDR, as does 
the range of discount rates applied by different governments to public projects. Appeal to the 
evidence from clinical studies is rather inconclusive. Salient features about this evidence are 
as follows (Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002). Measurement of the discount 
rates used by individuals is fraught with difficulties. The rates reported are highly 
heterogeneous across studies, and they are generally much larger than the rates of a few per 
cent used by governments for their SDRs. People apply high discount rates over short 
horizons, of up to about one year, and lower discount rates for longer future periods. With the 
important exception of this step reduction after one year, there is little clinical evidence that 
people apply declining discount rates. 
 The above discussion risks presenting use of the SDR-by-judgement approach as more 
firmly rooted than it actually is. The SDR was a rate based on market data in Lind (1982). 
Portney and Weyant (1999) summarise the deliberations of 20 leading public economists on 
the SDR in the context of climate change. There was agreement among them that a cost of 
capital based on market data should be used for projects with a life of up to 40 years, but that 
the SDR approach should be used for longer-term projects, because of ‘discomfort’ with the 
cost-of-capital approach for long-term projects. Weitzman (2007a) believes that a distinct 
SDR approach is not that of mainstream economics. 
 
4.2 The SDR and risk 
 It has been ‘commonly thought that the risk-free rate of return is appropriate for the 
appraisal of public projects due to the risk pooling available to governments’ (Groom et al, 
2005, p. 452; Arrow and Lind, 1970). This view has long been disputed, and the 
consumption-based theory outlined in Section 2.1 shows that, in general, it is not correct to 
ignore risk. A public project with uncertain future payoffs should only be discounted at the 
risk-free rate if the payoffs are uncorrelated with consumption per head, as is in fact assumed 
by Arrow and Lind (1970), and as is re-iterated by Lind (1982, p. 69). Neither the Stern 
Review (2006) nor any reviews of Stern take the view that government investment to alleviate 
climate change should be treated as risk-free by virtue of being funded by the government.12  
 The finance perspective on the risk of public projects can be summarised as follows. 
Both portfolio theory and consumption-based theory show that risk-averse investors demand a 
risk premium for exposure to systematic risk; that is, risk which is not eliminated through 
diversification by means of holding a portfolio of assets or projects. Each public project has 
its own discount rate, that depends on its systematic risk, as for private projects. Taxpayers 
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bear the risk of public projects. ‘Investing’ in public projects via paying taxes does not appear 
to offer greater elimination of risk than does investing in financial markets. Most 
unsystematic risk is eliminated by means of holding about 30 randomly selected shares, so a 
mature stock market provides more than enough opportunities for diversification. It is true 
that a government with a secure AAA credit rating can borrow at a lower cost of capital than 
the WACC of even the safest private-sector company. However, a sufficient reason for this is 
that a stable government can raise funds via taxation, which is a coercive method not 
available to a company. The coercive nature of taxation does not mean that the government 
has reduced project risk for the taxpayer. 
 Despite the importance of risk as a determinant of private sector discount rates, 
governments apply a single discount rate to all public projects (Spackman, 2008). A few 
governments now apply declining discounts rates, in which case the rate depends on the 
lifetime of the project. The fact that a single rate is used by a given government for all 
projects constitutes an important difference from the cost-of-capital approach. The practical 
finance package directs attention to differences in risk across companies and projects, which 
can result in large differences in the cost of capital, of several percentage points. 
 Risk looms much less large for the SDR, for a cluster of reasons. One is the mistaken 
tradition, just mentioned, that government funding in itself implies that the discount rate for 
all public projects is low. Second, the weight given to the welfare of future people, rather than 
risk, is seen as the primary determinant of the SDR. Guided by the Ramsey formula, future 
payoffs are discounted because society will be richer, and, if  is non-negligible, because 
utility in the future counts for less than utility today. The payoffs are not discounted because 
they are risky. 
 Third, the measurement of risk will often be more problematic for public than for 
private projects. Public projects typically involve non-commercial objectives, and provide 
‘payoffs’ that do not arise via cash flows. For example, what is the risk of investment to 
alleviate climate change? The cost of global warming is usually modelled as a fixed 
proportion of future output or consumption. In this case the size of the payoff, which is a 
reduction in that cost, is proportional to output, and the consumption beta is approximately 
one. A beta of one or more also arises in a model in which output before the impact of 
temperature increase has a linear positive effect on temperature, investment to reduce carbon 
emissions has a linear negative effect on temperature, and the marginal negative impact of 
temperature on output is increasing with temperature (Gollier, 2012). In this case the size of 
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the benefit of investment to reduce carbon emissions is positively related to underlying 
output, because the (non-marginal) relation between output and temperature is positive.  
 On the other hand, global warming might be sufficiently destructive as to have a major 
impact. Sandsmark and Vennemo (2007) assume simply that the non-marginal relation 
between temperature and output is negative. Let us assume also that reducing emissions has 
most impact on temperature if temperature growth will be high. Then this impact is negatively 
related to output, and the consumption beta is negative. Weitzman (2007a) argues that 
expenditure to reduce emissions is akin to the purchase of protection, an idea also in 
Sandsmark and Vennemo (2007). There might be a global catastrophe if emissions are not 
reduced, ie a large fall in consumption per head, with a probability that is non-negligible but 
impossible to quantify. On this view, the main benefit of reducing emissions is to reduce the 
probability of climate-induced catastrophe. If it were to turn out that there would be economic 
collapse under business as usual, and if our investment to reduce emissions were to succeed in 
averting the collapse, the payoff would be very large, and society’s marginal utility without 
the payoff might have been higher than today’s. This perspective implies a low or negative 
consumption beta for investment to alleviate climate change. This brief discussion suggests 
that our view about beta hinges on whether emissions, if not curtailed, could cause severe, 
non-marginal catastrophe in the future with a non-negligible probability. 
 Finally, the relevant conception of systematic risk is not settled. If the SDR is a rate 
determined by judgement in the setting of consumption-based theory, the systematic risk for a 
public project is measured by the correlation of the payoffs with consumption per head. But, 
then, the premium for risk is predicted to be small in consumption-based theory, as we have 
seen. The choice of consumption beta makes very little difference to the SDR in the standard 
model of Section 2.1, assuming that η and 2 are chosen from the range of conventional 
values. This potentially provides a justification for ignoring risk, though it is not a 
justification which has actually been used much in the SDR literature.  
 In contrast, if the SDR is estimated from market data, presumably risk is measured by 
beta in the CAPM, or by the betas in a multifactor model, by techniques that form part of the 
practical finance package. Use of market data implies an estimate of a premium for systematic 
risk of at least three per cent per year for a beta of one, and as a result the cost of capital is 
highly sensitive to the estimate of beta. 
 Our discussion here also raises the question of the relationship in practice between 
consumption and CAPM betas. The normal method of estimating the CAPM beta of a project, 
which is ultimately from the correlation of a share price with a stock market index, is 
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probably not an adequate method of estimating the consumption beta. There is no evidence 
about how estimates of the CAPM beta for private sector projects, using the practical finance 
package, compare with estimates of the consumption beta for the same projects. This is 
because consumption betas normally are not estimated for private projects. A second point is 
that the practical finance package is suited to estimating the risk and cost of capital of a 
project with cash flows. If a public project is undertaken by the private sector, there have to 
be forecast cash flows to provide payoffs to private finance. But the characteristics of the cash 
flows to private investors are influenced by the public sector sponsor. The risks faced by 
private investors, affecting the cost of capital set by investors, may well differ from the 
underlying risks of the project itself.  
 None of the above reasons mean that it is correct to assume that all projects are risk- 
free, or that they all have the same risk. At the same time, the measurement of the risk of real 
investment projects is a serious challenge for both public and private sector agents. A good 
deal of judgement is involved, and, for the cost of capital, the judgement made regarding 
choice of beta has a major impact on the discount rate. Although SDRs used in practice are 
not explicitly adjusted for risk, evidence from market data is likely to affect one’s view of the 
SDR that is chosen. Plausible numbers, used by governments for the SDR, range from the 
Stern Report’s 1.4% per year (in real terms) up to 6.0% or more. If a public sector executive 
chooses a low SDR, of around 1% to 2%, someone used to the private sector approach, in 
which risk matters, would see this SDR as implying a belief that public projects are close to 
risk-free. If the executive chooses a high SDR, of around 5% to 6%, this would imply a belief 
that public projects have a risk similar to investment in the stock market. 
 
4.3 Declining discount rates 
 A further difference between the cost of capital and the SDR is that a declining SDR is 
sometimes proposed. This is another aspect of the use of consumption-based theory to 
determine what the SDR should be. The cost of capital in practice and in finance texts is 
always a flat rate, although there is an observable term structure of government bond yields. 
Conventional discounting, with a flat rate, is sometimes referred to as exponential 
discounting, and discounting with a declining rate as hyperbolic discounting. 
 There are a number of arguments for, or models that result in, a declining discount 
rate. First, if the expected growth rate of consumption per period is assumed to diminish with 
time into the future, ie the expected g for periods in the far future is lower than g in the near 
future, the discount rate per period predicted by equations (5) or (8) will diminish. If a g is 
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negative in a given period, marginal utility increases, and the discount rate for the period 
could be negative. 
 Second, the analysis under uncertainty in Section 2.1 assumes that g shows random 
variation over time. A plausible type of modification is that the changes in g show some 
persistence. This can result in a declining risk-free rate, since persistence implies that the 
dispersion of possible future consumption increases with the time horizon by more than is the 
case under random variation. A greater dispersion of possible future consumption implies a 
lower discount rate, since it increases expected marginal utility (see equation (8)). Gollier 
(2013) reviews several types of modification which feature persistence in changes to future 
growth. 
 Third, if g follows a random walk, but the utility function exhibits diminishing 
relative risk aversion (DRRA) instead of CRRA, there will be a declining discount rate for a 
risk-free project (Gollier, 2002a). DRRA means that as an individual’s wealth increases, she 
would pay a smaller proportion of her wealth to avoid a risk given in absolute terms. Both 
DRRA and CRRA imply aversion to risk (diminishing marginal utility of consumption), but 
DRRA implies less aversion than CRRA. Intuitively, there are two opposing forces at work. 
The expected variance of Ct increases with the time horizon t, which reduces expected utility. 
This means that the expected utility from a risk-free asset – that is, expected marginal utility – 
increases with t, which implies a lower discount rate. On the other hand, if g per period is 
zero or positive, consumption increases over time, which reduces marginal utility, and implies 
a higher discount rate. DRRA is necessary for the first effect to dominate the second effect. If 
negative values of g are possible, then DRRA does not guarantee a declining discount rate, 
and more is involved in specifying the set of utility functions that result in a declining 
discount rate (Gollier, 2002b). 
 Fourth, if the discount rate for each future period is fixed but uncertain ex ante, there 
is a declining discount rate in the sense that, for a given collection of possible discount rates, 
the single, fixed discount rate that represents the range of possible rates declines as the 
number of future periods increases (Weitzman, 1998). This argument is easiest to understand 
by means of an example (Guo et al, 2006). Let the possible discount rates be 1%, 3% and 5% 
per year, each with equal probability. What Weitzman calls the certainty-equivalent discount 
rate for t years, CEDRt, is the discount rate which results in the same PV as the average of the 
PVs which arise from using each of the possible discount rates. CEDRt is calculated from the 
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certainty-equivalent discount factor, CEDFt, which is the weighted average of the discount 
factors for the possible discount rates: 
 CEDFt  =  1/(1 + CEDRt) = (1/3)[(1/1.01
t) + (1/1.03t) + (1/1.05t)] (17) 
For t = 10 years, CEDFt = 0.754 and CEDRt = 2.86%; for t = 100 years, CEDFt = 0.143 and 
CEDRt = 1.96%. The mechanism at work here is that, as the future horizon recedes, the 
lowest discount rate explains an increasing proportion of the PV. The argument only makes a 
difference if at least one of the possible discount rates is sufficiently low that PV is non-
negligible. If the time horizon is 100 years or more, and the lowest of the possible discount 
rates is around 4%, PV is approximately zero even using the lowest possible rate. 
 Gollier (2004) criticises this argument on the grounds that there is an implicit 
assumption of risk neutrality, and that the current generation is exposed to the risk (see also 
Guo et al, 2005). The future payoff is viewed as certain, while the PV is uncertain until the 
uncertainty about the discount rate is resolved. The decision about whether to invest in the 
project is made before this uncertainty is resolved, by comparing the expected NPV with the 
cost. Risk neutrality comes in because of the expected NPV calculation: each possible PV is 
weighted by its probability, with no adjustment for risk (or different marginal utilities in 
different states of the world at the time when uncertainty about the discount rate is resolved). 
The current generation bears the risk because the PV once uncertainty is resolved could turn 
out to be higher or lower than its expected value. Gollier (2004) notes that the conclusion is 
reversed if, in contrast, the aim is to calculate the expected future value, given the cost of the 
project. For long horizons the expected future value becomes dominated by the outcome in 
which the rate of return is the highest of the possible rates, and so the rate to assume in 
calculating the expected future value tends towards the highest rate, not the lowest, as the 
future lengthens. From this perspective the generation at the terminal date is exposed to the 
risk, as the future value could turn out to be lower than the expected future value. 
 The debate can be resolved by considering the question in the consumption-based 
model. We assume that the uncertain discount rate is the rate of return on saving (Gollier and 
Weitzman, 2010, with a linear production function) or the marginal rate of return on saving 
(Gollier, 2013, pp. 103-5). In this case it can be shown that the certainty-equivalent discount 
rate declines as t increases. The reason is the same as the reason why persistence over time of 
the uncertain growth rate can result in a declining discount rate. The assumption that the 
uncertain return on saving is fixed (very persistent) once the uncertainty is resolved means 
that, from the perspective of date 0, when the discount rate is unknown, the dispersion of 
possible future consumption outcomes increases with the time horizon by more than is the 
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case under random variation of g, for a given variance of g equal to the variance of the 
uncertain discount rate. Since the term structure is flat if g follows a random walk, the greater 
dispersion of consumption, compared with under a random walk, implies that the discount 
rate diminishes as t increases (assuming that η > 1). 
 This analysis re-establishes the case for a declining discount rate under the Weitzman 
assumption that the discount rate is uncertain now but will in future become known and fixed 
in perpetuity thereafter. However, the analysis is quite different from the original Weitzman 
(1998) argument. The latter is a point about the calculation of present value, and it is implicit 
in standard valuation procedures. The standard method of allowing for uncertainty about the 
discount rate is to calculate a range of possible PVs using several different discount rates. It is 
natural for the average of the possible PVs to be taken as the best-guess PV, so the Weitzman 
(1998) argument is merely highlighting an aspect of standard procedure. The Gollier-
Weitzman analysis is about how the discount rate is determined in the consumption-based 
model of Section 2.1, given the Weitzman (1998) assumption.   
 We have outlined several of the conditions under which a consumption-based theory 
results in a declining discount rate for a risk-free asset.13 These ideas are having an impact on 
practice; the UK, French, Danish and Norwegian governments now apply declining discount 
rates, and other governments have been prompted to do so (Cropper et al, 2014). 
 A further question is the term structure of the risk premium. If changes in g show 
persistence, equation (15) no longer holds; though the risk-free rate per period diminishes 
with the time horizon, the premium π = η2 per period increases (Gollier, 2012). This makes 
the value of long-term projects more sensitive to systematic risk than under a flat premium. 
However, recent evidence from dividend strips (Van Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen, 2013) 
and from property markets (Giglio, Maggiori and Stroebel, 2014) points to a declining risk 
premium inherent in market data. Perhaps in these markets uncertainty does not increase with 
the time horizon in the manner assumed when discounting a constant risk premium (Section 
2.2). 
 
4.4 The nature of the SDR  
 Consider a risky project, which has a single payoff with an expected value of $100 in 
real terms in 100 years’ time. The project is estimated to have a conventional CAPM beta of 
one. The discount rate derived from market data – the expected real rate of return on the stock 
market – is 5.0% per year, and with this discount rate PV = $0.8. A public sector executive 
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estimates the SDR to be 1.4% per year, and with this rate PV = $24.9. The cost of the project 
is $10, so it is acceptable using the SDR but not using the cost of capital. This example 
reflects the essence of the debate highlighted by the Stern Review. Given the estimated future 
costs of global warming, society should invest much more to reduce carbon emissions than is 
currently being invested, if a discount rate of 1.4% is used to value the benefits of reduced 
emissions. 
 Estimation of the (systematic) risk of carbon-reducing investment is problematic, as 
we have noted, and the market-based cost of capital is sensitive to estimated risk. If private 
investors judge such investment to be low- or zero-beta, this would approximately eliminate 
the discrepancy between the cost of capital and the SDR in the example, assuming that the 
real risk-free rate is between 1% and 2% per year. However, the reason the executive in the 
example chooses a lower SDR than the cost of capital is unlikely to be because she estimates 
the risk of carbon-reducing investment to be lower than the market’s estimate of the risk. The 
executive can agree that the CAPM beta for the project is one, and that the expected rate of 
return on equity is about 5% per year – and yet still choose a much lower SDR. 
 The reason the SDR for the project is 1.4% rather than 5.0% is that the executive 
thinks that society’s utility from the uncertain payoff to be received in 100 years time exceeds 
its utility from $0.8 today. The market does not ‘think’ in the same way, otherwise the market 
rate would be lower than it is. The SDR is a device to reflect judgements about the utility 
derived from payoffs at different future dates. An SDR which is lower than the market-based 
cost of capital is a means of indicating that, for reasons that depend on the judgement of the 
relevant executive, more resources should be transferred from the present to the future than 
would be the case were discount rates based on market data employed. 
 The reason for a below-market SDR is not because the cash flow from the project is 
underestimated. The Stern prescription, of much greater investment today to reduce carbon 
emissions, results both from recognition of the expected costs of unabated global warming, 
and from application of a low SDR. The low SDR is not to allow for the expected costs of 
global warming. This externality is recognised via a comprehensive cash flow forecast for 
emission-reducing investment. The low SDR is because the utility from the comprehensively 
measured cash flows is judged to be greater than the utility estimate that is implicit in the cost 
of capital. As a result,  or η or both are set so that the discount rates produced by equations 
(5), (8) or (15) are below the discount rates estimated by the practical finance package. 
 The impact of long-lived projects on future utility is a type of externality, if we make 
the ethical judgement that a market-based cost of capital involves placing too little weight on 
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future utility. It is a special type of externality, one that requires adjustment to the discount 
rate rather than the cash flow forecast, because it is an omission of some of the utility derived 
from the forecast cash flows. The higher weight for future utility implied by the SDR could be 
captured by increasing the cash flows to be discounted, and then using the higher market-
based cost of capital to discount these augmented cash flows. But then, we would not be using 
the SDR as the discount rate. Use of the SDR, rather than the cost of capital, means that we 
capture the different weighting of future utility in the discount rate. 
 The key counter-argument to support use of the cost of capital is that, in our example, 
the executive would make society better off in 100 years’ time by not undertaking the project, 
and instead investing the $10 cost for 100 years in the stock market (unless investors turn out 
to have overestimated long-term cash flows from the private sector). So it seems that the 
correct discount rate is the market rate. When funds ‘can be invested at the market rate of 
interest [or in the stock market], whether by the private sector or the public sector, it is clearly 
undesirable to divert them to an investment that will return the lower social discount rate’ 
(Brealey, Cooper and Habib, 1997, p. 20). 
 From the SDR perspective, the response to this is that society would be colluding in a 
mistake by investing in the stock market rather than emission reduction. The stock market 
undervalues projects to reduce carbon emissions, and in general, the market undervalues long-
term projects in relation to short-term projects, on the SDR view. It is true that a given 
investor would be better off in terms of expected wealth by investing in the stock market. But 
society as a whole would be better off in terms of expected utility with more emission-
reducing investment. The misvaluations in the stock market mean that the market fails to 
provide the incentives for the set of projects to be undertaken which would maximise 
intergenerational utility.  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 This paper has compared two rather separate approaches to the discount rate for long-
term projects. The table below draws together the main features of the two approaches, and 
their points of difference.  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Cost of capital 
 
Role of theory To understand the determinants of historic and expected rates of 
return on financial assets. 
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Estimation process An established package of techniques to infer expected rates of 
return on assets and projects from market data. Consumption-
based theory is not used for estimation. 
 
Key features The minimum real WACC for low-risk companies, eg utilities, 
is currently at least 4% per year. There is uncertainty about the 
equity risk premium; estimates used in practice range from 3% 
to 8% per year. An asset’s estimated (systematic) risk makes a 
large difference to WACC, because of the size of risk premium. 
The WACC applied is the same for each future year (no 
declining discount rate). 
 
Comments Mismatch between theory and evidence. Standard theory 
predicts a much smaller equity risk premium than 3%, and a 
larger risk-free rate than the historic 1%. A constant WACC per 
period requires an assumption that uncertainty increases with the 
time horizon.  
 
Social discount rate 
 
Role of theory To help determine what the discount rate should be. 
 
Estimation process Primarily judgement regarding the ingredients of the Ramsey 
formula. But no established procedure. Debate regarding the 
influence of expected rates of return inferred from market data. 
The difference in the estimation process between cost of capital 
and SDR means that the two approaches can produce 
substantially different estimates of the discount rate. 
 
Key features Normal practice is to estimate a common SDR to apply to all 
public projects. There is no tradition of estimating project risk or 
adjusting SDR for risk. The concept of declining discount rates 
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is important in recent SDR theory, and is now incorporated into 
SDRs applied by some governments.  
 
Comments Estimates of the SDR tend to be lower than the discount rate that 
would be estimated using the practical finance package. The low 
end is around 1% per year, which is massively lower than a low-
risk WACC from the practical finance package. This implies 
that markets undervalue long-term projects. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 The message from the finance literature is that there is nothing special about long-term 
projects, or about public projects. All projects are in principle valued in the same manner, 
which we have summarised as the practical finance package. The resulting discount rates are 
high enough that a payoff arising beyond a few decades into the future has a negligible PV, 
compared with its undiscounted value. Many economists are uneasy about this, and the paper 
identifies some possible reasons why. Consumption-based theory, which has been developed 
to explain how the expected rates of return on financial assets are determined, has given rise 
to a huge academic literature, but has so far made little impact on the practical finance 
package. 
 The message from the current SDR literature is that it is probably not appropriate to 
try to apply the practical finance package to public projects, especially those which affect the 
welfare of future generations. A different approach is called for, one which is informed by the 
consumption-based model, and which involves explicit ethical judgement. At the time of 
writing there is still much doubt about how to arrive at a specific number for the SDR, and 
about how relevant market-based evidence is to the SDR. 
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Footnotes 
1 See Armitage (2005), Danthine and Donaldson (2005), or Gollier (2013), for fuller 
expositions, all relatively accessible in terms of mathematics. 
2 See Ramsey’s equations (3) and (9); also Dasgupta (1982). Ramsey assumes non-increasing 
marginal utility, but does not specify a utility function. 
3 In the derivation of the standard CAPM, the individual’s existing consumption at date t 
comes entirely from the payoff from her holding of the market portfolio, so risk means 
positive covariance with the market portfolio. 
4 Lind’s (1982) review of the SDR draws attention to this question, but the question has since 
been somewhat ignored in both the finance and SDR literatures. 
5 In fact the correlation between returns on the stock market and growth of consumption per 
head is 0.2 at most, and the standard deviation of annual returns on the market is about 17% 
(US data; Cochrane, 1997). This gives cov(rj, g)  = (0.2)(0.17)(0.02) = 0.07% instead of 2 = 
(0.02)2 = 0.04%. 
6 In addition, Weitzman (2007a, 2007b) shows that, if g is assumed to have a distribution 
with fatter tails than the normal distribution, the possibility of ‘disaster states of the world’ is 
increased, which reduces the implied risk-free rate. 
7 See, for example, Graham and Harvey (2001), for survey evidence of company practice. For 
much more detail about implementation than appears here or in a textbook, see the 
documentation published by utility regulators and their advisers (for example, NERA, 2009). 
8 The judgement involves ethics in that it directly involves taking an explicit view about how 
much the welfare of people in the future matters compared with the welfare of people today. 
The finance approach is to accept the ‘view’ about intergenerational welfare that is implicit in 
market data. 
9 Dasgupta (2008) and others argue that, in the absence of ‘market imperfections’, society will 
maximise its lifetime utility and the social discount rate will be equal to the market rate of 
return on investment. His conception of market imperfections includes the existence of 
externalities which are not reflected in the rate of return on investment. There are more 
conventional types of market imperfection which might also make it difficult to infer from 
market data the revealed preferences of the current population regarding social decisions, 
including taxes and poor information on the part of the population. 
10 Assuming a constant return on investment (ROI). The trust would reduce the interest rate if 
there were diminishing returns on investment. With a constant ROI, rF = ROI, otherwise the 
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rate of saving would not be optimal. The growth rate in the Ramsey model is then g = (ROI  
δ)/η. The trust’s activities imply a lower δ or η for society than would prevail without the 
trust, and a higher saving rate and growth rate. 
11 There is no established method of estimation from private sector data, ie no equivalent to 
the practical finance package. Earlier literature does consider which private sector rate of 
return, or average of such rates, to use in estimating the SDR. The main issue was not risk, but 
the fact that the (pre-taxes) rate of return on private investment is higher than the (after-taxes) 
rate on individual saving. Recent reviews, for example Gollier (2013), Dasgupta (2008), and 
Weitzman (2007a), almost ignore tax. 
12 Stern (2008, pp. 13-14) does argue that a close-to-risk-free rate is relevant for projects to 
reduce carbon emissions, but on the questionable grounds that they are ‘likely to be financed 
via the diversion of resources from consumption (via pricing) rather than from investment’. 
13 Aspects of the implementation of the Gollier (2002a) and Weitzman (1998) models are 
reviewed in Groom et al (2005). 
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